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CONGRESS-IN-CHIEF:
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS TO
COMPEL PRESIDENTIAL WARMAKING
Clark H. Campbell*
ABSTRACT

The last time Congress declared war was in 1942 against Rumania. Since then
American troops have been sent into action with, and in some cases without,
authorizations to use force instead of a formal declaration of war. Americans are
accustomed to hearing about the President using more force than he is technically
allowed by the Constitution, over the objections of Congress. But what if the roles
were switched? If Congress declares war over the objections of the President, can the
President be forced to make war in accordance with Congress' demands? When
Congress makes a formal declaration of war in accordance with Article I Section 8 of
the Constitution, is the President obligated to direct US troops into battle against the
enemy state or group? If Congress asks the President to use force, is the President
required to comply?

* Clark Campbell is a 2016 graduate (Juris Doctor) of the J. Reuben Clark School of
Law at Brigham Young University. He is a Captain in the United States Air Force Judge
Advocate General's Corps and currently serves as Chief, Adverse Actions at Scott Air
Force Base in Illinois.
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INTRODUCTION

The last time Congress declared war was in 1942 against Rumania. 1 Since then
American troops have been sent into action with, and without, authorizations
to use force rather than with a formal declaration of war. 2 Americans are
accustomed to hearing claims that the current President has used more force
than he is explicitly allowed by the Constitution, over the objections of
Congress. 3 But what if the roles were reversed? If Congress declares war 4 over
the objections of the President, can Congress force the President to make war 5
in accordance with its demands? When Congress makes a formal declaration
of war in accordance with Article I Section 8 of the Constitution, is the
President obligated to direct US troops into battle against the enemy state or
group? If Congress asks the President to use force, is the President required
to comply? The Supreme Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer told
us that "[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed

1

U.S. Senate: Official Declarations of War by Congress https://www.senate.gov/
pagelayout/history/h_multi_sections_and_teasers/W arDeclarationsbyCongress.htm
(last visited Aug. 26, 2018).
2 See, e.g., Off. Legal Counsel, 2011 WL 1459998, Authority to Use Military Force in
Libya (2011); see also Kevin Lamarque, Should Obama consult Congress before conducting
airstrikes in Syria?, CBS NEWS (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/shouldobama-consult-congress-before-conducting-airstrikes-in-syria/.
3 See Charles Babington & Juliet Eilperin, House Votes to Require Assent for Ground
Troops, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 1999), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/poli tics/ dailyI april99/house042999 .htm (evidencing allegations of Presidents using
unauthorized force were made against President Clinton); see also Scott Wilson, Obama
administration: Libya action does not require congressional approval, WASH. POST (Jun. 15,
2011 ), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-administration-libya-actiondoes-not-require-congressional-approval/2011/06/15/AGL ttOWH_story .html;
Jacqueline Klimas, Obama launches 2,800 strikes on Iraq, Syria without congressional
approval, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2015) http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2015/apr/27/congress-still-not-specifically-authorizing-islami/?page=all.
4 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 11 (Congress' power to declare war includes nuances and
limitations that this article will not discuss).
5
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The President's constitutionally granted role of
Commander in Chief includes the power to make war. See id. This article will not
discuss the nuances and limitations of the President's power to make war. The power
to make war will be treated as a simple power to command U.S. forces in both peaceand war-time.
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or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter." 6 The idea of the President resisting military action
may seem absurd, but has been borne out by history:
Today, of course, we are so accustomed to thinking of Presidents as
more hawkish than Congress that the hypothetical of a dovish
President would strike many as preposterous. Yet, history provides
a number of commonly ignored examples: John Adams resisted calls
for a declaration of war against France in 1798 and instead sought
authority for the limited and undeclared Quasi-War; James Madison
was ambivalent about declaring war on Britain in 1812; Grover
Cleveland in 1896 rebuffed the proposal by various members of
Congress to declare war on Spain; William McKinley in 1898
reluctantly conceded to the same war fervor; and Woodrow Wilson
successfully campaigned for reelection in 1916 on the slogan, "He
kept us out of war." 7

In fact, there are recent examples of Congress acting hawkish 8 over the
objections of the President. In 2015, Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas sent a
letter to the leaders of Iran warning against making a nuclear deal with
President Obama. 9 While Senator Cotton's actions did not amount to an
outright threat of war, his actions represented a more hardline approach
toward Iran than that of President Obama.
It may give helpful context to the reader to imagine possible scenarios
based on political sentiment in the not-so-distant past when Congress could
have taken a more hawkish approach than the President. First, Congress

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
7
J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L. J. 27, 85-86 (1991).
8 See Hawk, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hawk
(2018) (defining "hawk" as "one who takes a militant attitude and advocates
immediate vigorous action; especially: a supporter of a war or warlike policy"); see also
Dove, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionaryI dove (last
visited Mar. 11, 2019) (defining "dove" as "one who takes a conciliatory attitude and
advocates negotiations and compromise; especially: an opponent of war").
9 Jennifer Steinhauer, Senator Behind Iran Letter Is Latest Freshman Republican to Stir
Things Up, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/03/12/us/politics/senator-behind-iran-letter-is-latest-freshman-republican-to-stirthings-up.html? _r= 1.
6
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could have sought a preemptive strike against Iran. As Senator Cotton's letter
shows, popular sentiment to some degree opposed any course of action that
could result in Iran gaining nuclear capabilities. 10 Senator Cotton seemed to
be threatening a re-imposition of sanctions, 11 but if Congress wanted to disable
Iran's nuclear program permanently, the President could have been pressured
to attack locations vital to Iranian nuclear development. Second, Congress
could seek a greater American military presence in Syria. If the terror group
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) becomes resurgent in and around
Syria, Congress may push for military action to control the situation and end
the conflict. Third, greater Russian involvement in Ukraine could encourage
Congress to request military counteraction to control Russian aggression and
protect Eastern Europe. Finally, Congress could ask the President to respond
more forcefully against Boko Haram in Nigeria, as the Nigerian Ambassador
requested early in 2015. 12 These scenarios, while not the most current
examples of Legislative-Executive tension, will be helpful to illustrate the
application of the principles discussed in this article. Modern warfare can
include myriad methods including cyber-attacks, economic attacks, biological
attacks, espionage, or political subversion. 13 However, this article will focus
on how Congress could force the President to make war in a traditional,
physical attack. Congressional power and approaches will differ if Congress
seeks to pursue other methods of warfare.
I will proceed based on a hypothetical situation in which Congress
declares war or passes an act calling for military action, and the President
responds by expressing his unwillingness to make war or by exercising his

10

Letter from U.S. Senators to Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Mar. 9, 2015),
https://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=120 [hereinafter Letter from U.S.
Senators].
11 Id. (reminding Iranian leaders that Congress must approve any agreement made
with Iran).
12
Amb. Adebowale Ibidapo Adefuye, Nigeria and US must work together to fight Baka
Haram, THE HILL (Mar. 2, 2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreignpolicy/234146-nigeria-and-us-must-work-together-to-fight-boko-haram.
13 See Eric Talbot Jensen, Future War, Future Law, 22 MINN. J. INT'L L. 282, 282 (2013)
(discussing the evolution of warfare and its impact on developments in the law).
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veto. 14 After the President exercises his veto, Congress overrides that veto, 15
and expresses an intent to pursue military action over the President's
objections. Congress then must decide under what theory of law the President
must follow their orders or how Congress can force presidential action.
Congress would not lightly decide to override presidential objections and
declare a war that the President refuses to support. But, the idea that Congress
may seek war over the President's objections is not beyond imagination. This
article will analyze that situation and the constitutional and practical issues
attached to it. For this purpose, Congress will be treated as a single unit acting
in concert against the President. In addition to prescribing avenues of action
to a Congress seeking to compel the President, I hope to inspire thought and
research into this and other areas of Legislative-Executive relations. 16
Congress has many possible courses of action to attempt to compel the
President to make war. The options, in decreasing order of severity, include
impeachment, a lawsuit to compel the President to act, a lawsuit against
another executive officer, use of the power of the purse to constrain the
President, a loan of US troops to a state or organization willing to make war,
or an act directing specific presidential action. If Congress successfully forces
presidential action, a new question becomes important: to what degree must
the President make war? This question will be discussed after presenting each
possible approach for Congress.

Although there are some actions that

Congress could take to compel the President to make war, 17 the most likely to
succeed are the application of the power of the purse or passage of a specific
law directing presidential action.
This article will examine the options available to Congress, following the
order listed above. Sections II through VII will present the mechanisms
Congress can use to compel the President to make war and discuss problems
with each approach. Section VIII will address the question of the degree of
war-making required of a President.

See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 7, cl. 22.2.
See id.
16 See Letter from U.S. Senators, supra note 10.
17 See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 23-24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (exploring
14
15

congressional and Executive war powers).
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IMPEACHMENT

A. Constitutional Power to Impeach 18

Impeachment-or the threat of impeachment-of the President, is one option
for Congress to respond to a President that is unwilling to make war. If a
President can be galvanized to action by the threat or initiation of
impeachment proceedings, Congress may be able to "force" war-making.
Alternatively, if a President does not respond to the threat of impeachment,
Congress could remove that President from office. 19 Once the President is
removed, Congress could expect a more willing Executive to cooperate in
plans for war. However, there are significant challenges to the use of
impeachment as a tool to compel presidential action, the first being the ability
of Congress to impeach. 20
The Constitution of the United States grants power to Congress to remove
the President from office if he is impeached by the House of Representatives
and convicted by the Senate. 21 In the history of the U.S., no President has ever

18

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representatives shall choose their
Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment."); U.S.
CONST. art. I,§ 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.
When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the
President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person
shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.").
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation.
When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And
no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members
present. Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal
from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit
under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject
to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.")
2°Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 286 (1998). ("The
third position, which ultimately carried the day, was that the President should be
impeachable, but only for a narrow category of abuses of the public trust-for example,
by procuring office by unlawful means, or using distinctly presidential authority for
ends that are treasonous.")
21
U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 3, cl. 6.
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been removed from office through the process of impeachment. 22

The

Constitution grants Congress the power to impeach the President in cases of
"high crimes and misdemeanors." 23 Scholars disagree over the meaning of
high crimes and misdemeanors. 24 Some argue that "impeachment is an
appropriate remedy only where a public officer has committed a criminal act
while in office." 25 This would shut the door on the ability of Congress to
impeach a President for any political action or inaction unless those acts can
be prosecuted as a criminal offense. Others posit that "an impeachment
offense is whatever a majority of the House [considers it] to be at a given
moment in history." 26 This view gives much greater power to Congress,
essentially turning impeachment into a political weapon to be used at the
discretion of whichever elected representatives can command a majority of the
House and a two-thirds majority of the Senate.
A possible hook for Congress' impeachment comes from the word high"
in the Constitution's description of impeachable offenses as high crimes and
/1

misdemeanors.

This modifier, scholars suggest, does not apply to the

magnitude of the offense, but rather to the nature of the crime or
misdemeanor. 27 The word "high" suggests that an act for which Congress may
22 Stephen B. Presser, Standards for Impeachment, in ESSAYS ON ARTICLE II, THE
HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION: FULLY REVISED SECOND EDITION (David F. Forte
&
Matthew Spalding
eds.,
2014)
http://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/
articles/2/essays/100/standards-for-impeachment (last visited Aug. 29, 2018).
Presidents Andrew Johnson and William Clinton were both impeached but were not
convicted by the Senate. See id. President Richard Nixon resigned his office before the
House was able to vote on articles of impeachment. See id.
23 U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 4, cl. 1.
24 See e.g., Raoul Berger, Impeachment for "High Crimes and Misdemeanors", 44 S. CAL.
L. REV. 394, 403 (1970-71); Laurence H. Tribe, Defining High Crimes and Misdemeanors:
Basic Principles, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 717 (1998-99); Neil Kinkopf, The Scope of
High Crimes and Misdemeanors after the Impeachment of President Clinton, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 201, 202 (2000).
25 Harold Baer, Jr., How Serious Is the Threat of Impeachment? And to Whom?, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 1598, 1599 (1998) (reviewing MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT
PROCESS-A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (1996)).
26 Id. at 1602 (alteration in the original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Gary L. McDowell, "High Crimes and Misdemeanors": Recovering the Intentions of the
Founders, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 626, 634 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27 Sunstein, supra note 20, at 283.
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impeach is "a 'crime or misdemeanor' carried out against the commonwealth
itself." 28 In this case, certain political acts would fall within the range of
Congress' ability to impeach. Congress could argue that a President who fails
to follow Legislative directives, particularly a declaration of war, has put our
nation at risk-committed a crime against the commonwealth. 29 Assuming
Congress is unified enough to act together in declaring and seeking war,
voting on articles of impeachment would not present a major challenge. 30

B. Impeachment of President Andrew Johnson
The impeachment of President Andrew Johnson exemplifies the
circumstances under which a president could be impeached for opposing the
will of Congress. President Johnson was impeached for violating an act that
sought to take a portion of his executive power. 31 The Tenure of Office Act,
enacted in 1867, restricted the President's power to remove officers by
requiring Senate approval for any removal. 32 The President vetoed the Act
after it was passed. 33 Congress overruled the President's veto, and the Act
became law. 34 The cabinet of President Johnson advised him that the Act was
unconstitutional because it subjected the executive power of the President to

McDowell, supra note 26, at 638. See also Joseph Isenbergh, Note, The Scope of the
Power to Impeach, 84 YALE L. J. 1316, 1324 (1975).
29 McDowell, supra note 26, at 641.
30
See, e.g., Isenbergh, supra note 28, at 1332 (ignoring the possibility of Congressional
censure of the President). A President who vetoes an act of Congress and then ignores
the subsequent overruling of his veto would not likely respond to a simple censure by
Congress. Even if Congress formalized their censure and supported their actions with
arguments based in the Constitution, an unwilling President would be unlikely to
respond.
31 See generally EDMUND G. Ross, HISTORY OF THE IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW JOHNSON
(The Echo Library ed., 2007) (1868) (detailing an exhaustive history of the events
leading up to and constituting the impeachment and trial of President Andrew
Johnson).
32
Tenure of Office Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1869); Post Office Department Act, ch.
335, 17 Stat. 284 (1872).
33 See Ross, supra note 31, at 66.
34 Id. at 63; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (ruling the Act
unconstitutional).
28
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the review of Congress. 35 After being advised on the unconstitutionality of the
Act, President Johnson suspended Secretary of War Edwin Stanton in direct
violation of the Act and appointed Ulysses S. Grant to take Stanton's place. 36
As a result of President Johnson's violation of the Tenure of Office Act, he was
impeached in February of 1868.37 After the House approved the articles of
impeachment, President Johnson was tried in the Senate. 38

He avoided

conviction by just one vote.39
In the case of President Johnson's impeachment, Congress passed an act
over the veto of the President. When President Johnson acted in violation of
that act, Congress impeached the President for refusing to follow its
directive. 40 Rather than refusing to act, as in the premise of this article,
President Johnson acted in opposition to Congress, but the situations are
closely related. The articles of impeachment adopted by Congress, although
presented under the name of "high crimes and misdemeanors," evidence an
attitude that an impeachable offense is "whatever a majority of the House
[considers it] to be at a given moment in history." 41 The political nature of
President Johnson's impeachment suggests that Congress was not above using
its power of impeachment as a tool to force the President to take or refrain
from taking certain actions. Considering the example of President Johnson, it
is not difficult to imagine Congress taking a similar course of action to compel
a President to make war. Impeachment is difficult, even when a President has
clearly committed criminal acts, such as perjury. 42 The difficulty of conviction,
especially based on non-criminal articles of impeachment, is a substantial
roadblock to the use of impeachment to compel presidential action.

35
36

See Ross, supra note 31, at 63-64.
See Ross, supra note 31.

Id.
3s Id.
39 Id.
37

See Ross, supra note 31, at 66-67.
116 Cong. Rec. H11913 (Apr. 15, 1970) (statement of Gerald Ford).
42 Alison Mitchell, The President's Acquittal: The Overview; Clinton Acquitted Decisively:
No
Majority
for
Either
Charge,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
13,
1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/13/us/president-s-acquittal-overview-clintonacqui tted-decisi vely-no-majori ty-for .html.
40

41
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C. Problems with Impeachment
Other problems with the impeachment approach are significant. First, the
process of impeachment could take a significant amount of time. Declaration
of war would be put on hold during the presentation of and voting on articles
of impeachment and the trial and removal of the President from office. The
longest impeachment trial in the U.S. lasted only three months, 43 but assuming
Congress felt a pressing need for military action, even such a slight delay could
prove disastrous. Second, once the President is successfully impeached and
removed from office, Congress would have no guarantee of Executive action.
The Vice President would assume the office of the President, and there is no
guarantee that he would comply with Congress' intentions.

The new

President could appoint another Vice President, and the cycle would continue.
If the Vice President were impeached concurrently with the President and the
Speaker of the House assumed the Presidency, action would be more likely,
because the Speaker would come from the body of Congress, which has
declared and is seeking to make war. But that would only take place after
having passed through the significant delay of two impeachments. Finally,
articles of impeachment based on the President's failure to make war would
be highly political. Congress' impeachment of President Johnson proves that
such articles can result in impeachment, but that impeachment, and all other
attempts at impeachment since, show that successful conviction is unlikely.

See Douglas 0. Linder, Chronology, Famous American Trials: The Andrew Johnson
Impeachment, UKMC SCH. OF L., http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/impeach/
43

Chronology.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2019) (providing a timeline of President Andrew
Johnson's life from 1864 to the repealing of the Tenure of Office Act in 1887, including
the dates for President Johnson's three-month impeachment trial); see also Douglas 0.
Linder, The Impeachment Of President William Clinton: A Chronology, UKMC SCH. OF L.,
http://law2.umkc.edu/facul ty/projects/ftrials/ dinton/ clintonchrono.html (last visited
Mar. 10, 2019) (discussing the timeline of the impeachment of President Bill Clinton).
233
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LAWSUIT AGAINST THE
PRESIDENT

A. Authority to Sue the President
Congress can seek to compel a President to take certain action by resorting to
the third branch of the Government, the Judiciary. 44 Historical cases of
individuals and groups suing the President of the United States have been
numerous. 45 Courts have hesitated to assess judgments against the President,
even when they had the authority to do so. 46 Two important cases in U.S.
history have explored the option of compelling presidential action through
lawsuit: National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 47 and Mississippi v.
Johnson. 43 Other pertinent cases, discussed at the end of this section, highlight
problems with this approach. 49 A Supreme Court ruling against the President
would be a major step for Congress toward compelling presidential action.
The basis on which a lawsuit is brought affects the success and reach of that
lawsuit and any resulting judgment. Nixon and Johnson provide valuable
lessons for framing suits against the President.

44 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see Louis Jacobson, Nancy Pelosi says U.S. House 'has
never sued a sitting president in all of U.S. history', TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jul. 31, 2014),

http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2014/jul/31/nancy-pelosi/nancypelosi-says-us-house-has-never-sued-sitting-/.
45
Sebastian Payne, Republicans v. Obama - and other times the president has been sued,
WASH.
POST (Jul. 11, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/postpoli tics/wp/2014/07/11/republicans-v-obama-and-other-lawsui ts-against-presidents/.
46 See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Emp. Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
("But because this Court possesses that jurisdiction and accordingly possesses the
authority to mandamus the President to perform the ministerial duty involved herein
does not mean that this Court must or should exercise that authority at this time. On
the contrary, this Court may, if it believes it more appropriate, refrain at this time from
issuing a writ of mandamus to the President and opt instead to act pursuant to the
provisions of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970)"); Franklin
v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 802 (1992) (" ... the District Court's grant of injunctive
relief against the President himself is extraordinary, and should have raised judicial
eyebrows.").
47 492 F.2d at 587.
48 Miss. v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475 (1867).
49 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (2000).
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National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon 50

i.

In Nixon, the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) sought to compel
the President to perform his duties under an act of Congress, the Federal Pay
Comparability Act (FPCA).s 1 NTEU argued that the President was required
to implement a comparability pay adjustment by a certain date or to inform
Congress of an alternative pay adjustment plan.s2 The District Court for the
District of Columbia dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction on separation
of powers grounds.s 3 The District Court also held that the statute directing the
President to act was subject to various constructions and applications, and so
was at the President's discretion in enactment. s4 But on appeal, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found jurisdiction and decided that the FPCA
created a ministerial duty that did not allow for presidential discretion.ss The
court found the duties required of the President to be "mandatory, involving
no discretion."s 6 Because the FPCA did not leave any discretion to the
President in adjusting federal pay scales, the NTEU was entitled to have the
President act according to the statute.s 7 The court next considered the question
of the remedy available to the NTEu.ss Were the FPCA to require action of
another federal official other than the President, a writ of mandamus would
be the appropriate remedy, requiring little deliberation by the court.s 9 After a
lengthy discussion of constitutional principles and pertinent case law, the
court decided that it also had the jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus
compelling the President to fulfill his duty under the FPCA. 60 But the court
declined to say that the power to issue a writ of mandamus necessarily implied

50

492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Id. at 591.
52
Id. at 592.
51

Id.
Id. (holding that with no clear duty established by the statute, the President was
free to act in a number of discretionary ways to meet the intent of the statute).
55 Id. at 601.
56
Id. at 616.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 602.
59 Id.
60
Id. at 616.
53

54
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a duty to issue a writ. 61 The court instead issued a declaration of law, judging
that to be sufficient to compel the President to act in this case. 62
ii.

Nixon Applied

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit decided in Nixon that it had the
power to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the President to take action in
certain cases. 63 The court specifically stated that it is the duty of the Judiciary
to keep the Executive within Legislative limits. 64 In the case of President
Nixon, the court failed to issue a writ of mandamus, instead issuing a
declaratory ruling against the President for failure to faithfully execute the
laws. 65 How does Nixon apply to the issue of compelling the President to make
war?
As the court stated in Nixon, the fact that an actor is the President does not
mean that all duties are discretionary. 66 Some areas could be so firmly within
the Executive's realm that action in those areas cannot be compelled by the
court. 67 The issue of areas committed to the Executive was addressed more
fully in Johnson, but the primary focus here is that the Nixon court was clear
that a statute giving only ministerial duties is one that does not raise a political
question 68 and can thus be enforced by the court. 69 A problem arises when the
clear ministerial duty is one that infringes on the President's Executive
authority. Can Congress pass a law that removes the President's discretion
from an Executive function? 70 But assuming that such a law could be passed
in the area of war-making, it seems feasible that the court could find a power
to compel the President to stay within the Legislative limits. Laws affecting

Id.
Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67 Id.
61

at 616.
at 602, 616.
at 604.
at 616.
at 613.
at 615.
68
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (discussing political question doctrine).
69 Id. at 603-04.
70 See Discussion, infra Part VII.
62
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the power to make war were more directly discussed by the Supreme Court
over 100 years earlier, in Johnson. 71
Mississippi v. Johnson 72

iii.

The State of Mississippi filed a motion with the Supreme Court, asking for
leave to file a bill restraining the President from enforcing the Reconstruction
Acts. 73 Although Mississippi wanted to restrain the President from carrying
out certain responsibilities, the Court found that the general principles that
apply in restraining the President apply to compelling presidential action. 74
The Court decided that it did not have the power to compel the President to
act in cases where Congress allowed the President any discretion in action. 75
Because the Reconstruction Acts allowed the President discretion, the Acts did
not create a ministerial duty, and the Court could not compel or restrain
presidential action. 76 The Court conspicuously distinguished their opinion
from a discussion of ministerial duties. 77 In duties where the President has no
discretion, the Court's decision in Johnson is less applicable.

Johnson Applied

iv.

The Court in Johnson recognized that there are certain presidential duties that
cannot be compelled by the Court, even when a specific law directs those
actions. 78 In areas "purely executive and political" the Court can have no
power to force the President's hand. 79 Duties of the President that fall within
his role as Commander in Chief are a prime example of "purely executive and

See Miss. v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475 (1867).
Id.
73 Id. at 497.
74
Id. at 499 ("It is true that in the instance before us the interposition of the court is
not sought to enforce action by the Executive under constitutional legislation, but to
restrain such action under legislation alleged to be unconstitutional. But we are unable
to perceive that this circumstance takes the case out of the general principles which
forbid judicial interference with the exercise of Executive discretion.").
75
Id. at 500.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 498.
78 Id. at 500-01.
79
Id. at 499.
71

72

237

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

[Vol. IX: I

political" duties. 80 Although in Nixon the Court ruled that they had the power
to compel presidential action, the Court in Johnson declared that to compel the
President as Commander in Chief would be "an absurd and excessive
extravagance." 81 The power of the Judiciary to compel the President in warmaking seems to be dubious at best. Therefore, Congress would have a
problem using the Courts to compel the President to use force because the use
of force is a purely Executive area of responsibility.

B. Problems with a Lawsuit Against the President
More problems await Congress in an attempt to compel presidential action
through judicial process. The political question doctrine, ministerial law
requirement, and requirements for standing make a lawsuit against the
President an uphill battle. Even if Congress succeeds in a suit against the
President, the judgment won could be unenforceable for the reasons discussed
below.
i.

Political question doctrine

First, the Judiciary may never accept a case based on the President declining
to make war, in part because political questions are eschewed by the courts. 82
The courts will find that a political question exists when six factors are met. 83
The Court in Baker held that a political question involves (1) a commitment of
the issue to another branch by the Constitution; 84 (2) an inability to apply
judicial standards to the question; 85 (3) the need for an initial policy
determination, not appropriate to be made by the Court; 86 (4) disrespect to
another branch of government if a decision were made; 87 (5) a need to follow

so Id.
s1

Id.

See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (finding cases that involve a political
question are nonjusticiable).
s3 Id.
s4 Id.
ss Id.
s6 Id.
s7 Id.
82
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political decisions that have already been made; 88 and (6) the potential for
confusion and embarrassment if multiple branches of government gave
differing guidance on an issue. 89 The Court distinguished political cases,
which involve political rights or repercussions, from political questions. 90
Some areas of presidential action, such as foreign relations, were thought to
always present political questions, thus outside the purview of the courts. 91
However, foreign affairs are not exclusively a political question, and the
Supreme Court determined that those areas may sometimes involve questions
subject to judicial determination. 92 On the other hand, compelling a President
to make war is a situation so clearly fitting in the six factors for a political
question93 that the courts may choose to avoid it completely. 94
ii.

Ministerial law requirement

The second problem for a lawsuit against the President is the need to pass a
sufficiently ministerial law as to be enforceable by the courts. 95 A law that
removes enough discretion from the President to be ministerial would likely
be considered unconstitutional, for reasons discussed in Part VII of this
article. 96 But the very creation of such a law would itself be difficult. The
Supreme Court decided that even when the President made only the final act
88

Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.

Id.
Id. at 211 (stating that cases involving the six elements that define a political
question are nonjusticiable).
91 Id.
92 See id. at 209-24 (including specific examples of justiciable questions in
traditionally political areas).
93
Id. at 217 (listing the elements for identifying a question as a function of separation
of powers, to include (1) Declaring and making war are clearly committed to the
Legislative and Executive branches, respectively, excluding completely the Judiciary;
(2) Judicial standards are ill-equipped to determine the providence of war-making; (3)
whether or not to make war is soundly based on policy determinations by President
and Congress; (4) a judicial determination would fly in the face of either Congress or
the President; (5) second-guessing the state of war by the Court would cause confusion
in Government and the Public; (6) embarrassment of either Congress or the President
would be the sure result of a judicial determination of this issue.).
94 Id.
95 Nat'l Treasury Emp. Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
96
See infra Part VII.
89
90

239

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

[Vol. IX: I

in a long string of directed actions, that duty was not ministerial. 97 If a law
were not sufficiently ministerial, leaving any discretion to the executive, the
President would be immune from suit in performing that duty. 98 The
difficulty involved in creating a ministerial duty to make war makes the
prospect of suing the President unlikely.
iii.

Requirement of standing

Courts only have the jurisdiction to decide cases brought by litigants who have
suffered some actual injury and whose claims are meant to be addressed
under the law. 99 In Campbell v. Clinton,1° 0 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit found that a group of congressmen did not have standing to sue the
President101 for committing U.S. forces to Yugoslavia without congressional
authorization. 102 Congress sought a declaration from the court that the
President had acted beyond the confines of the law. 103 Instead of reaching a
decision on the merits of the case, the court held that the congressmen did not
have standing to bring the suit. 104 Part of the court's reasoning was based on
the myriad political tools available to Congress to restrain the President. 105
The congressmen brought the suit because they had been frustrated in their
attempts to use those tools to restrain the President effectively. 106 The court
held that unless a President acted in a way that nullified congressional votes,
legislators should use the political means available to influence the
President. 107

97

Although Congress in Clinton was seeking to restrain the

Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800 (1992).
Nat'l Treasury Emp. Union., 492 F.2d 587 at 609.
99 Standing, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
10 °Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
101 Id.; see also Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 115 (D.D.C. 2011).
102 Campbell, 203 F.3d at 20.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 23-25.
105 Id. at 23.
106 Id.
107 While a presidential veto may be seen as a "nullification" of congressional votes,
it is instead an override. The nullification spoken of is one that removes any effect from
votes, essentially destroying the ability of congressional members to express their
political opinions or desires. Cf id.
98
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President, similar arguments can be made when Congress seeks to compel
presidential action. The availability of political means may result in a lack of
standing for congressional efforts to compel the President by recourse to the
Judiciary.
iv.

Presidential indifference

Assuming there is recourse through the courts, the Judiciary may be unable to
enforce any judgment against the President. A President who disagrees with
a decision of the Judiciary could conceivably ignore any injunction issued by
the court. The Supreme Court made this clear in Johnson: "[s]uppose the bill
filed, and the injunction prayed for allowed.

If the President refuses

obedience, it is needless to observe that the court is without power to enforce
its process." 108 The Court relies on the Executive to enforce its decisions, and
this has resulted in a lack of obedience to Court decisions in the past. 109

Ill.

LAWSUIT AGAINST
ANOTHER OFFICER

A. Authority to Sue another Officer
Judicial action is not limited in application to the President. The Secretary of
Defense could be sued, 110 resulting in an analysis similar to that of a suit
against the President. Congress could also attempt to enforce their desires for
war by bringing a lawsuit against another executive officer, such as a general
in actual command of U.S. troops. The United States cannot be sued except as
it allows itself to be sued, but exceptions to this rule may be made by
Congress. 111 Courts have disallowed suits against military officers in the

Miss. v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 500-01 (1867).
Examples include President Jackson's response to Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515
(1832), and the slow response to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110 See, e.g., Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252, 253-55 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (per curiam);
Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 543-61 (4th Cir. 2012); Mitchell v. McNamara, 352
F.2d 700, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam).
111 See U.S. v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586-88 (1941) (stating that under the principle
of sovereign immunity, the United States is generally immune from suit unless it gives
its consents to being sued).
108
109
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past, 112 but Congress has the authority to authorize lawsuits against executive
officials. 113 The Supreme Court is especially willing to allow congressional
suits in areas more subject to civilian control, such as the military. 114 Congress
could conceivably allow a suit against not only the Secretary of Defense, but
also against general officers of the military. 115
B. Possible Outcomes of Suing Another Officer
This course of action, rather than compelling the President to act, seeks to
circumvent the President and bring about the same result by effectively
cutting the President out of the picture. At best, this approach would create
an issue of conflicting directives to military commanders. Within the realm of
reasonableness, there are three possible outcomes to a lawsuit seeking to
compel an executive officer other than the President.
In the first possible outcome, a court would dismiss the suit as
representing a political question.

Since the power to make war is

constitutionally committed to the Legislative and Executive branches, the
doctrine of separation of powers suggests that those branches are the ones that
should resolve the issue. 116

Nixon suggested that a statute allowing

discretionary action would be a political question outside the realm of
ministerial duties and, thus, outside the Court's right to decide. 117 The second
possible outcome of a lawsuit against an executive officer would be a
See, e.g., Bork v. Carroll, 449 Fed. App'x 719, 720 (10th Cir. 2011) (rejecting a
plaintiff-appellant's claims against U.S. military officers and the Secretary of Defense
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), aff'g 2010 WL 11519638, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Oct.
22, 2010).
113 See Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 587-88.
114 Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) ("[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of
governmental activity in which the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle,
and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a
military force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always to civilian
control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.").
115 Id. at 11-12 ("[I]t should be clear that we neither hold nor imply that the conduct
of the National Guard is always beyond judicial review or that there may not be
accountability in a judicial forum for violations of law for specific unlawful conduct by
military personnel whether by way of damages or injunctive relief.").
116 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 221 (1962).
117 See Nat'l Treasury Emp. Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
112
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successful suit. In the case that a court decided that it had the power and right
to decide the question, the court could issue a judgment ordering the official
to follow the law. 118 The probability of such an outcome is extremely low, as
it would require a law sufficiently specific to take all discretion from the officer
in the making of war. 119
unconstitutional.

120

Such a law would almost certainly be

But if a court did reach a decision compelling an executive

officer to make war, the solution would be quite simple for the President:
reassignment of the officer.

The President could not remove the officer

altogether without good cause, 121 but reassignment would be just as
effective .122
The third outcome-and the ultimate outcome of the second coursewould be the removal of the officer by the President as soon as the suit was
filed, making the point moot. If an executive officer were to compromise the
President's desire to remain aloof from war, the President would need only
remove that officer from his place of duty by reassignment. Any attempt by
Congress to restrict the ability of the President to remove an officer would
surely be deemed unconstitutional, especially as applies to the removal of an
official as closely connected with the Executive as a military commander. 123

118

Id. at 612-13.

Another impediment in this scenario would be that the more liable to suit an
officer is, the more likely she is to be far from the President, meaning she has more
tactical decision-making ability but less ability to make strategic decisions.
120 See infra Part VII; Cf Nat'l Treasury Emp. Union, 492 F.2d at 612.
121 Cf McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 437-38 (1880) ("[N]o officer of the
military or the naval service should in time of peace be dismissed from service except
upon and in pursuance of the sentence of a court-martial to that effect, or in
commutation thereof.").
122 Scott Wilson & Michael D. Shear, Gen. McChrystal is Dismissed as Top U.S.
Commander in Afghanistan, WASH. POST (Jun. 24, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/23/
AR2010062300689 .html? sid=ST2010062504101.
123 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S. Ct. 21, 28 (1926); Free Enter. Fund
v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010); Charles Tiefer, Can
Congress Make A President Step Up A War?, 71 LA. L. REV. 391, 435 (2011) [hereinafter
Tiefer, Can Congress Make A President Step Up A War?].
119
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C. Problems with Suing Another Officer
The three outcomes discussed above clearly highlight the issues associated
with a congressional attempt to compel war-making through a lawsuit against
an executive officer. But other problems would further complicate a suit
against another officer. The Supreme Court is reluctant to "extend the waiver
of sovereign immunity more broadly than has been directed by the
Congress." 124 And even an extension of the waiver may encounter difficulty
in passing political question analysis. 125 Beyond what has been discussed, a
lawsuit of this kind would entail great expense and large amounts of time.
Congress could probably authorize suit against a military officer, file suit, and
ultimately compel an officer to act or be removed, but the result would not be
the fulfillment of congressional will. 126 The President could quickly replace
the officer who was compelled to act or removed by Congress. If Congress
were to attempt to pursue this route, it would almost surely be an exercise in
futility.

IV.

THE POWER OF THE PURSE

A. Constitutional Authority for the Power of the Purse
The Legislative branch of the United States Government has one weapon that
has been extremely effective in Legislative-Executive battles, the power of the
purse. "This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most
complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the
immediate representatives of the people . . . ." 127 This power is especially
pertinent as applies to the power to make war. 128 Congress' power to control
the budget and spending of the President may be the best chance at controlling
presidential action, especially in the realm of war-making.

U.S. v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 502 (1940).
For a discussion of political question doctrine see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 20952 (1962).
126 Myers, 272 U.S. at 109-10.
127 THE FEDERALIST No. 58, (James Madison) (AVALON PROJECT DOCUMENTS IN L., HIST.
& DIPL.), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed58.asp.
128 Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Article: Pulling the Purse Strings of the
Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 835 (1994).
124
125
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This area of Congress' power has been extensively explored by scholars
and repeatedly tested by the Judiciary. 129 The power of the purse has even
been explored in its application to Congress' ability to compel war-making in
an excellent article by Charles Tiefer. 130

Tiefer focused on the ability of

Congress to use spending riders to force the President to increase the tempo
and intensity of an ongoing war. 131 Drawing from the work of Tiefer and
others allows greater insight into the ability and limitations of Congress not
only to step up a war, but also to compel the President to enter a war. 132

B. Appropriations Riders
The main route for Congress to exercise the power of the purse is through
riders to appropriation bills. 133 Riders force a President to follow certain
conditions or become subject to certain limitations to receive the funding
appropriated. 134 While the President has discretion to reject the bill and the
included rider, the funding would also be lost. Congress has much more solid
ground on which to stand for limitation riders than riders compelling action,
but both are available to Congress. 135 While many scholars and pundits argue
against the power of Congress to compel presidential action, "even supporters
of presidential power would concede that Congress could plainly and simply
cut off funds" and end a war. 136 Past appropriation riders have sought to use
limitations to prohibit the President from acting in various areas, for example
continuing war in Afghanistan. 137
129

Notably, in 2007, the House Judiciary Committee held a special scholarly hearing
on Congress's war powers. See Tiefer, Can Congress Make A President Step Up A War?,
supra note 123, at 416.
130 See generally Tiefer, Can Congress Make A President Step Up A War?, supra note 123,
at 391-449.
131
132

Id.
Id.

133 Neal Devins, Appropriation Riders, 1635 WM. & MARY FAC. PUBLICATIONS 67, 67-68
(1994), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1635.
134 Id. at 67.
135

See generally id.

Charles Tiefer, Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit from Iraq?, 42 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 291, 293 (2006) [hereinafter Tiefer, Appropriations Riders Speed Exit].
137 See H.R. 780, 112th Cong. (2011-2012). This proposed bill restricted the use of
military funds in Afghanistan "only for purposes of providing for the safe and orderly
136
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Tiefer posits that the ability of Congress to attach enforceable conditions
to appropriations bills falls into three categories, closely resembling the
Jackson concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 138 On one end
of the spectrum, Congress is most likely to successfully attach riders when
they deal with issues of shared responsibility between the Executive and
Legislative branches. 139 In the middle, where Congress' ability to use riders is
dubious, riders are attached to influence the President in areas where the
President has Executive responsibility, but not central to those areas of
Executive power. 140 The third category involves areas central to the
President's responsibilities. 141 Tiefer states that due to Youngstown, in this last
category, congressional attempts to legislate are presumptively
unconstitutional because it infringes on one of the President's core powers the power to make war. 142
In the context of this article, Congress could attempt to add riders to
appropriation bills forcing the President to make war. Riders would direct the
President to take specific action against enemies of the United States. If the
President wanted to keep the country funded and other projects operating, the
bill would be approved, and the rider would come into effect. However,
myriad problems erupt once the provisions of the appropriation rider become
law. The main dilemma for Congress would be the invasion of the President's
area of core Executive responsibility. 143 While the power to declare war rests
firmly with the Congress, 144 the authority to make war belongs to the President

withdrawal from Afghanistan of all members of the Armed Forces and Department of
Defense contractor personnel who are in Afghanistan." Id.
138 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952).
139 Tiefer, Can Congress Make A President Step Up A War?, supra note 123, at 417.
140 Id.
Tiefer gives the example of Congress increasing troop levels in a country
neighboring a war zone. Allocation of troops outside of combat would not fall directly
into the core responsibility of the President to make war but is an area where the
President has executive responsibility and therefore falls into Youngstown's second
category. See id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).
144 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 11.
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as Commander in Chief. 145 Because the power to make war is a clearly
Executive power, using Tiefer's analysis, this law would be presumptively
unconstitutional as invading an area of core Executive responsibility. 146 Even
assuming the law were constitutional, enforcement would still be an issue.
Congress would have to resort to impeachment147 or judicial action148 to force
the President to follow the law. Therefore, while Congress would probably
have some success compelling action through an appropriation rider, the
passing of such a rider would only be the first step in compelling presidential
action.

C. Government Shutdown
The second avenue open to Congress through the power of the purse is the
equivalent of the nuclear option. Congress could refuse to allocate funding to
anything unless the President responds to congressional directives to make
war. Congress has threatened and carried out government shutdowns in the
recent past, both purposefully and because of an inability to reach
consensus. 149 While this option seems to have great potential to force
presidential action, it carries with it a host of issues. Constituents are likely to
be unhappy with their representatives if a government shutdown occurs. 150
By precipitating a shutdown, Congress runs the risk of committing political
suicide with the American people and permanently damaging relations with
the Executive. Further, if a President is firm enough to ignore congressional
requests, laws, and other congressional actions, there is a strong likelihood
that the President would ignore the threat of a shutdown, even at great cost to

U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 1.
Id.
147 See supra Part II.
14s See supra Part III.
14s
146

149 US faces another partial government shutdown, ALJAZEERA (Feb. 26, 2015),
http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/americas/2015/02/faces-partial-governmentshutdown-150226040528670.html.
150Dareh Gregorian, Angry furloughed federal workers protest shutdown at the White
House, around the country NBCNews.com (2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/
politics/white-house/angry-furloughed-feder al-workers-protest-shutdown-whitehouse-around-country-n957356 (last visited Feb 28, 2019).
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the taxpayer. 151 Forcing a government shutdown would be unlikely to have
the desired effects while causing harmful collateral damage.

D. Problems with the Power of the Purse
Congress faces many limitations in using the power of the purse to attempt
control of the President. These limitations go beyond the political dangers
described above and may limit the ability of Congress to use its power in the
area of war-making altogether. 152 Such limitations on congressional power
may be for the best.153
i.

Practicality

Practicality limits Congress. Tiefer cautions, "[i]t is all but impossible to write
... riders that carry out delicate and complex policies while satisfying the
requirements for a limitation amendment." 154 Limitation riders-laws that
restrict presidential action-are complex enough to cause serious issues for
lawmakers. But crafting riders compelling the President to make war would
be an almost impossible task. The complexities of logistics, strategy, joint
operability, and tactical execution are only a few of the facets that Congress
would have to address. Some scholars believe that riders that go beyond
limitation may be unconstitutional. 155
Tiefer' s paradigm for analyzing appropriation riders is useful in this
analysis. 156 The ability to make war is a function central to the Executive. 157
The actual operations of war-making, including target selection, strategy, and

David E. Sanger, Government Shutdown Cost Is Estimated at $700 Million, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 23, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/l 995/l l/23/us/government-shutdown-costis-estimated-at-700-million.html.
152 See Tiefer, Appropriation Riders Speed Exit, supra note 136.
153 Nicolas L. Martinez, Pinching the President's Prosecutorial Prerogative: Can Congress
Use Its Purse Power to Block Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's Transfer to the United States?, 64
STAN. L. REV. 1469, 1482 (2012) ("James Madison, for one, supported keeping the power
of the purse at arm's length from the war power, and George Mason likewise counseled
that the 'purse & the sword ought never to get into the same hands."').
154 Tiefer, Appropriation Riders Speed Exit, supra note 136, at 307.
155 See Devins, supra note 133.
156 See Tiefer, Appropriation Riders Speed Exit, supra note 136, at 307.
157 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1
151
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troop movements are core elements of the Executive's commander-in-chief
power. 158 As the issue is so central to the Executive, a rider seeking to control
the President in this area would be presumptively unconstitutional. 159 Some
scholars suggest that Congress may not even be able to introduce riders in the
area of foreign affairs generally. 16° For example,
in the area of foreign affairs, Congress itself would violate the
Constitution if it refused to appropriate funds for the President to
receive foreign ambassadors or to make treaties. Congress ... may
not exercise this power in a manner inconsistent with the direct
commands of the Constitution. 161

Since the Constitution explicitly gives the President power to make war, and
the drafting history of the Constitutional Convention suggests that the
Framers specifically chose not to give this power to Congress, the specific acts
of war-making seem to fall in the exclusive purview of the Executive. 162 One
scholar suggests a two-step approach to determine if Congress has the
authority to use riders to influence a specific area:
In short, it seems to me that the starting point should be to first ask
whether Congress, under an enumerated power, has the ability to
legislate in the particular foreign affairs area that is under
consideration, and if so, from where do they get the power. Further,
it must be determined whether the power or ability of Congress to
legislate derives from a specific grant or from some reasonable
penumbra of a specific grant. The second question that must be

158

Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
Id.; see also Martinez, supra note 153, at 1491. These are what Tiefer calls
"provisions that collide with one of the central issues for the Commander in Chief-command, disposition of forces, or campaigning." See id.
160 See Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L. J. 1343, 1350-51 (1988)
(Asserting that Congress could run afoul of the Constitution by not funding
constitutionally mandated Presidential activities).
Although Congress is
constitutionally barred from doing so, unconstitutional action by Congress would force
the President to decide to sue Congress or let the rider stand. If the President were to
sue Congress, a host of additional issues would result.
161 Id.; see also John Norton Moore, Do We Have an Imperial Congress?, 43 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 139, 153 n.25 (1988).
162
John Yoo, Declare War, THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION,
http://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/articles/l/essays/49/declare-war (last visited
Apr. 10, 2015).
159
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asked, even if the answer to the first question is yes, is whether
Congress, in a particular case, has interfered with an area exclusively
under presidential authority. An answer of no to the first question,
or yes to the second, should prohibit congressional activism in the
area.163

Whatever the approach, Congress is sure to walk a fine line of constitutionality
when legislating in the area of war-making.
ii.

Presidential counter-action

The President can also take some specific actions to counteract congressional
efforts to introduce an appropriation rider. The President may take some
action to directly attack the rider. The President does not have the option to
veto just the appropriation rider while keeping the money appropriated.
Presidents in the past have appealed to Congress to grant the Executive a lineitem veto. 164 A line-item veto would give the President power to veto only a
part of a bill, without affecting other parts of the bill. This power was granted
for a short time, but the Supreme Court later found it unconstitutional. 165 As
an alternative, Presidents have historically used signing statements to express
their interpretation of a law or belief that a law is unconstitutional. 166 But
signing statements do not have the force of law, and the President would
therefore still be bound by the law. 167 A President can use the signing
statement of a bill to express their belief that a law is unconstitutional, that the
law does not apply in certain situations, or merely to express an unwillingness
to follow the provisions of the rider. In fact, through a signing statement, a
President can effectively ignore a rider. For example, President Clinton relied
on the characterization of a law as unconstitutional when he "opined that the
President could reject a condition on national security funding and yet still
spend the funds." 168 A signing statement by President George W. Bush

Moore, supra note 161, at 144-45.
Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
16s Id.
166 Presidential Signing Statements, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/law/
help/statements.php (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
167 Id.
168 Tiefer, Appropriations Riders Speed Exit, supra note 136, at 312.
163
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asserted that the notice requirement of a funding bill concerning new military

installations abroad might violate his constitutional grants of executive power
as Commander in Chief." 169 The President can also attempt to use public
opinion against Congress. President Theodore Roosevelt turned a limiting
rider into a trap for Congress. 170 In such a situation, Congress is left with no
real recourse but to pull the purse strings tighter and hope the President gives
in to the pressure.
Although Congress' power of the purse is a mighty force in many other
areas of legislation and governance, it seems that in compelling the President
to make war this power may fall short. If the President ignores efforts by
Congress to use the power of the purse to compel war-making, Congress
cannot do much in response. 171 Even if the President does not ignore an
appropriation rider, the will of Congress could still be frustrated. 172

IV.

LOAN OF TROOPS

A. Possible Authority to Loan Troops
To circumvent the President and make war, Congress could try to loan U.S.
troops to another actor. This option is not completely feasible and may be one
that Congress would not even consider. However, the legal issues presented
in this option are interesting and have been considered by advisors and
scholars apart from this article. 173 A loan of troops to the United Nations or a
U.S. ally would be a risky move, but a desperate Congress might make an
Id. at 312-13 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 332 ("[W]hen Congress halved the appropriation President Theodore
Roosevelt had requested for a Navy fleet to sail around the world, he is said to have
responded that he would have the fleet sail halfway around the world and leave it up
to Congress if they wanted to bring it back.").
171 Congress would likely have no ability to impeach or sue the President for allowing
a shutdown, especially since the blame for a shutdown would be shared by Congress
and the President.
172 See Part VIII, infra
173 See, e.g., Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or
Tactical Control, 20 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 182 (1996); but see Richard Hartzman,
169
170

Congressional Control of the Military in a Multilateral Context: A Constitutional Analysis of
Congress's Power to Restrict the President's Authority to Place United States Armed Forces
under Foreign Commanders in United Nations Peace Operations, 162 MIL. L. REV. 50.
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attempt. This course of action will almost surely fail because the Constitution
directly grants the power of Commander in Chief to the President. 174 Supreme
Court jurisprudence seems to concur. 175 In Youngstown, Justice Jackson, in his
famous concurrence, states that the Commander in Chief clause "undoubtedly
puts the Nation's armed forces under presidential command." 176
B. Problems with Loaning Troops

Apart from the clear constitutional issues with loaning troops to another
entity, Congress would encounter additional practical roadblocks. The
President, as Commander in Chief, is possessed of established lines of
communication to direct U.S. armed forces. 177 Because of easy communication
and the historical arrangement of presidential command, U.S. armed forces
would arguably be more likely to follow the directives of the Executive than
those of Congress, were instructions from those parties to the conflict.
American commanders and soldiers might also take issue with being asked to
fight under the command of another entity, even if the alternative command
were the United Nations. 178 If Congress left U.S. commanders enough control
over troops to be effectively in charge, the President would likely be able to
retain command. If Congress were to give over command of U.S. troops to

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) ("Whatever the
scope of this authority in other contexts, there can be no room to doubt that the
Commander in Chief clause commits to the President alone the power to select the
particular personnel who are to exercise tactical and operational control over U.S.
forces.").
176 See id.; see also Tiefer, Can Congress Make A President Step Up A War?, supra note
123, at419.
177 See U.S. ARMY, U.S. Nat'l Military Chain-of-Command, https://dde.carlisle.army.mil/
LLL/DSC/ppt/Ll9_2branches.pdf, (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (delineating the formal
lines of communication between the President and the armed forces; see also U.S. DEPT.
OF DEFENSE, Meet the Team, https://www.defense.gov/Our-Story/Meet-the-Team/ (last
visited Mar. 11, 2019) (discussing the leadership and organizational structure of the
Dept. of Defense.).
178 U.S. forces do not typically operate under the operational control of other nations.
See NATO, Why SACEUR Has Always Been an American Officer, https://shape.nato.int/
page214845858 (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (discussing the rationale for U.S. command
of NATO forces in Europe).
174
175
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another entity, there could be repercussions more serious at home than any
occurring abroad.

V.

SPECIFIC LAW DIRECTING
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION

A. Constitutional Authority for Creating a Specific Law
Involved in many of the possible approaches discussed above is the matter of
issuing a law specific enough to direct the President to act in accordance with
congressional will without allowing him to undermine that will by exercising
executive discretion. A ministerial law is necessary to allow the Supreme
Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the President to act. 179 A specific
law would also be required in the suit of an executive official other than the
President and in creating appropriations riders. 180 Nixon requires a law
directing the President to perform a ministerial duty before that duty can be
enforced by the Court. 181 Johnson also requires that Congress must act to
remove presidential discretion before the Court can compel presidential
action. 182
In order to write a sufficiently narrow law, Congress would need to direct
every aspect of war-making so as to deprive the President of any discretion.
While Congress has shown itself to be expert in the crafting of complex
legislation, 183 a law directing every aspect of war would be extremely difficult
to create. However, assuming that Congress could create legislation meeting
the requirements of a ministerial law, would the President be compelled to
follow that law? Assume Congress could write a law to meet each of the
proposed scenarios in Part 1. 184 A law listing critical targets for disabling Iran's
nuclear program, directing when strikes would take place, and which forces

Nat. Treasury Emp. Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Id.
181 Id.
182 See Miss. v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 499 (1867) (stating that in the area of war-making
even a specific law may not be allowed to compel the President).
183 See, e.g., U.S.C. Title 26 (demonstrating the thoroughness, complexity, and detail
with which Congress can craft legislation).
184 See supra Part I.
179
180
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would carry out the strikes seems to be sufficiently specific to compel the
President. The same would be true of laws directing specific detachments to
make ground attacks on specific targets in Syria; designating cities in Ukraine
as locations for stationing defensive military groups and equipment; or
creating strategy to combat Boko Haram in Nigeria. Ministerial duties
prescribed by law would require the President to take the action Congress
ordered. 185 If a President chose to ignore those laws creating ministerial duties,
Congress could then impeach the President with a firm legal basis. 186 Congress
would encounter the same problems enumerated above 187 but would have a
more certain argument for impeachment than they would in the absence of a
specific law directing presidential action. A lawsuit against the President or
another executive officer would also have a better chance of success after the
passage of a specific law. 188 The Supreme Court would look more favorably
on a request to issue a writ of mandamus if the President were refusing to
follow specific directives set forth by congressional action. 189 Again, Congress
would face many of the difficulties explained above but would stand on a
more secure legal footing.
B.

Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha190

Does the Constitution even allow Congress to pass a law so specific as to take
away the President's discretion in making war? The Supreme Court
considered a similar question in the case Immigration and Naturalization Service

v. Chadha. 191 Chadha, a foreign national, sued Congress challenging the
constitutionality of a part of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 192 Congress
had created a mechanism whereby a resolution from the House of
Representatives could defeat immigration decisions of the Executive branch. 193

185

Nat'l Treasury Emp. Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Id.
187 See supra Part II.
188 Nat'l Treasury Emp. Union, 492 F.2d at 604.
189 See supra Part III; Nat'l Treasury Emp. Union, 492 F.2d at 604.
190 I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
191 Id.
192 8 U.S.C. § 1254( c)(2).
193 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 923.
186
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This effectively created a legislative veto of executive action. 194 The Court
found that the legislative veto was unconstitutional because it violated
separation of powers principles. 195 Congress is required by the Constitution
to involve both houses and the President in the creation of legislation. 196
Although the Court recognized that the legislative veto was a useful political
invention, 197 Congress' violation of the President's constitutionally granted
role made the law unconstitutionaJ.19s

C. ChadhaApplied
The Court made clear that Congress cannot act in a way that violates the
Constitution. 199
As the Court decided in Chadha, Congress acts
unconstitutionally by invading or removing constitutional powers of the
President. 200 Separation of powers is one of the central principles of the
Constitution of the United States and is inherent in the very structure of our
Government. 201 Congress is limited to taking action in those areas delegated
to it by the Constitution. 202 The position of Commander in Chief, holding the
power to make war, is specifically delegated to the President by the
Constitution. 203 Congress was given the power to declare war, arguably
removing from Congress' purview the power to make war. 204 The President,
while restricted from issuing a declaration of war, is the sole repository of the
power to carry out war-making. 205 The Supreme Court described the duties of

194
195

Id. at 944-45.
Id. at 959.

196

U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 11.
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967-68.
198 Id. at 960.
197

Id.
Id.
201 Id. at 946.
202 Id. at 957-58.

199
200

203 U.S. CONST. art II,§ 2, cl. 1; see also Madsen v. Kinsella, 93 F. Supp. 319, 323 (S.D.W.
Va. 1950) aff'd, 188 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1951) aff'd, 343 U.S. 341 (1952) ("[T]he President,
as commander-in-chief, is given the power to wage the war which Congress has
declared.").
204 U.S. CONST. art. I§ 8, cl. 11; Yoo, supra note 162.
205 Louis Fisher, The "Sole Organ" Doctrine., LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (2006),
https://fas.org/sgp/eprint/fisher. pdf.
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the Commander in Chief as "purely executive and political." 206 The specific
areas of chain of command, disposition of forces, and military campaigning
are central to the President's power to make war. 207 To allow Congress to
control the President in those areas, or to allow the Court to do so, would be
"an absurd and excessive extravagance." 208 The areas of core importance to
the role of Commander in Chief are those which are necessary to making
war. 209 Thus, if Congress were to seek to legislate in the area of war-making,
any such law would almost certainly be found to offend to the Constitution.
D. Problems with a Specific Law

As discussed above, Congress faces significant hurdles when seeking to create
a specific law directing the President to act. The practical issue of creating a
law sufficiently specific to be ministerial is a major obstacle. If Congress left
any discretion to the President, the law would not be enforceable as a
ministerial duty. 210 Creating a law specific enough to be ministerial would be
even more difficult because it would have to respect the separation of powers
doctrine. 211 A law that gave Congress any of the powers specifically granted
to the President would likely be found unconstitutional, leaving the President
to act according to his discretion. As a result, although a specific law would
give Congress powerful leverage to compel the President to act, significant
obstacles militate against the use of this approach. 212

VI.

To WHAT DEGREE?

Based on the discussion above, the ability of Congress to compel war may be
quite limited. However, there have been various points in this article where
analysis has shown that Congress might have a chance of compelling the
President to make war. Assuming any of the points addressed in this paper
are reached where the President or another officer is compelled to make war,
Miss. v. Johnson, 71US475, 499 (1866).
Tiefer, Can Congress Make A President Step Up A War?, supra note 123, at 400.
208
Miss., 71 U.S. at 499.
209 Tiefer, Can Congress Make A President Step Up A War?, supra note 123, at 400.
210
Franklin v. Mass., 505 U.S. at 788, 800 (1992).
211 I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
212 Id.
206
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to what degree can Congress commit the President to action? Consider one of
the previously discussed scenarios: the military is poised to make a
preemptive strike against Iran, move into Syria, take up defensive positions in
Ukraine, or initiate a military campaign against Boko Haram. Is the President,
reluctant up to this point to take any action, required to bring all the combined
might of the U.S. military to bear to comply with a law compelling him to take
military action? Could the President instead comply by launching one missile
against the enemy? By dropping just one bomb? Could the President send
one lone soldier into battle? While these actions would certainly not meet the
vision of a Congress that sought war, would they satisfy the legal requirement
to make war? Absent a law directing specific military action, which would
likely be unconstitutional; Congress seems to have little power to directly
control the military action taken by the President in making war.
The President has recently shown his willingness to water-down the
actions directed by Congress. 213 Recently, Congress authorized sanctions,
military coordination, and other actions in Ukraine and Syria. 214 The President
has followed many of the directives in these bills but has, in some cases, taken
actions of a lesser magnitude than Congress intended. 215 The power of
Congress to compel action by the President is severely limited by the fact that
the degree of action required is often unclear. 216 This is true especially when
the constitution restricts Congress in the specificity of law allowed to be made
due to constitutional restrictions. 217

VII.

CONCLUSION

For better or worse, a hawkish President seems to be the norm in modern U.S.
politics. History books and the news are both full of examples of Presidents

213
Josh Lederman, Foreign Affairs chair says Trump is ignoring sanctions on Russia for
former spy poisoning, NBC NEWS (Jul. 26, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/

politics/congress/foreign-affairs-chair-says-trump-ignoring-sanctions-russia-formerspy-n894961.
214
S. Res. 2828, 11th Cong. (2014) (enacted).
215

See id.

216

Nat'l Treasury Emp. Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

217

See supra Part VII.
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making war or using force without congressional approval. 218 The Office of
Legal Counsel has argued that the President has the authority to make war, or
take war-like actions, in many situations without the express approval of
Congress. 219 While the ability of the President to take unilateral action has
been examined and dissected, the opposite of the situation has not been
analyzed. If the President takes a dovish approach and Congress acts
hawkish, what is the result? Can Congress compel the President to make war?
In each of the scenarios presented in this article Congress would declare
war or ask the President to use military force, the President would decline or
veto Congress' request, and Congress would overrule the veto and continue
to pursue the use of force. A declaration of war against Iran or Russia, a
request of military action against ISIS or Boko Haram, or any other attempt to
commit U.S. forces to action could create a situation where Congress is forced
to seek an alternative method to compel presidential action. The scenarios
presented may seem unlikely, but the legal issues surrounding them are both
interesting and important.

This article has analyzed various options for

Congress in seeking to compel the President. This discussion has not been
exhaustive, but the main points for each option have been presented and
discussed.
Impeachment of the President requires that Congress frame the actions of
the President as a high crime or misdemeanor. 22° Congress has shown itself
willing to impeach for seemingly political offenses, as in the impeachment of
President Johnson. 221 Yet, Congress would still face the problems of delay in
the face of military threat while conducting the impeachment proceedings, as
well as a potentially belligerent replacement for the impeached President.

Every use of military force since World War II has been without a formal
declaration of war. Many uses of military force have been conducted under
authorizations for the use of force; but others have been carried out without any direct
approval from Congress.
218

The President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against
Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL,
219

http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc092501.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
22 o U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 4, cl. 1.
221 See Discussion, supra Part II.
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Congress can sue the President to compel action, but only for his conduct
in carrying out a ministerial duty 222 in an area not committed exclusively to
the executive. 223 A suit by Congress would also face the issues of being
dismissed by the court as presenting a political question or due to a lack of
standing. Congress could sue an officer other than the President, but it would
face issues similar to those posed by suing the President. Even in a successful
case against another officer, the President could reassign that officer to another
post and thwart Congress' efforts.
The power of the purse is available to Congress as a tool to compel
presidential action.

The use of appropriations riders or the threat of a

government shutdown provides powerful leverage to force the President to
act. Congress would face the issue of crafting riders specific enough to compel
the President to take the action intended by Congress. Even if a specific rider
where created, the President could discount the rider in a signing statement
or even ignore it completely. But despite these problems, the power of the
purse seems to be Congress' best bet at compelling the President to act.
Congress could attempt to loan U.S. forces to another nation for use in
making war. However, as discussed above, loaning troops to another nation
or entity would be completely ineffective both politically and practically.
Congress would likely have the least amount of success in making war by this
method.
Congress can write a law specific enough to be a ministerial duty,
enforceable by the courts and by impeachment. However, congressional
attempts to create a law including sufficient specificity would likely fall short
and be ineffective or invade the constitutional powers of the President and be
declared unconstitutional.
Congress is unlikely to compel the President to make war. Each of the
above options is fraught with difficulty in both implementation and
enforcement. Thus, although Congress has been given many constitutional
tools to influence the balance of power between the branches of government,
those tools seem better suited to restraining rather than compelling action.
Justice Jackson famously wrote that "[w]hen the President takes measures

222
223

Nat'l Treasury Emp. Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Miss. v. Johnson, 71US475, 499.
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incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at
its lowest ebb .... " 224 But when, instead of taking measures, the President
refuses to take action, it appears that Congress has little power to compel such
action. Congressional power is often overtaxed when Congress seeks to
restrain the President from the use of force, but it would be even more taxed
to compel military action.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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